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Abstract: This paper discusses the analysis approach when using event trees and fault 
trees in a quantitative risk assessment context. The basic question raised is when to 
introduce probability models and frequentist probabilities (chances) instead of using 
direct probability assignments for the events of the trees. We argue that such models 
should only be used if the key quantities of interest of the risk assessment are frequentist 
probabilities and when systematic information updating is important for meeting the aim 
of the analysis. An example of an event tree related to the analysis of an LNG (Liquefied 
Natural Gas) plant illustrates the analysis and discussion.  
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1.   Introduction 
     A common perspective on risk is the so-called triplet definition based on Kaplan 
and Garrick [5]:   
Risk is equal to the triplet (si, pi, ci), where si is the ith scenario, pi is the 
probability of that scenario, and ci is the consequence of the ith scenario, i = 1,2, 
…N.   
     For unique situations, the probabilities are interpreted as subjective probabilities 
(also referred to as knowledge-based or judgmental probabilities), whereas, if repeated 
similar situations can be generated, the probabilities pi have to be understood as 
frequentist probabilities (also referred to as chances). In the following we will use the 
subscript f to indicate when the frequentist interpretation is adopted. These probabilities 
are unknown, and subjective probabilities are used to express the (epistemic) uncertainties 
about the true value of the frequentist probabilities. The framework then established is 
referred to as the probability of frequency approach to risk assessment.     
     In practice, however, it is not obvious which of these two approaches should be 
adopted. When is the situation unique? Consider the event tree in Figure 1 representing 
release scenarios for an LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) plant (Vinnem [8]). Are these 
events unique or can we justify the construction of chance models based on these events 
reflecting variation in the phenomena studied? What approach should we take?  This is 
the issue of the present paper. We seek to establish some guidelines for when these two 
approaches should be used. An example case based on the event tree of Figure 1 will be 
used to illustrate these two approaches and highlight the differences. It is straightforward 
to adjust the analysis to fault trees.
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Figure 1: Example of event tree for an LNG case 
     The issue discussed is related to the distinction between aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties in risk assessment (Helton [3], Winkler [9]). The probability/chance models 
reflect the aleatory uncertainties, whereas the subjective probabilities express the 
epistemic uncertainties.  
     The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in Section 2, we study the event tree in 
Figure 1 assuming the situation is unique. We summarize the features of this case and 
discuss its pros and cons. Then in Section 3 we consider analogously the case with 
probability models introduced. The final Section 4 provides some conclusions. The paper 
is partly based on Aven [2].  
2.   The Unique Event Case    
     The aim here is to implement the Kaplan and Garrick [5] scheme for the examples 
shown in Figure 1 for the unique event case. Let  
X = number of releases (which is approximately equal to 1 if a release occurs and 0  
 otherwise, as we ignore the probability of two releases in the period studied) 
Z1 = I(A)  (I is the indicator function which is equal to 1 if the argument is true and 0  
 otherwise),  A: Immediate ignition   
Z2 = I(B),     B: Delayed ignition  
Z3 = I(pool fire)   
Z = (Z1, Z2, Z3). 
We see that if a release occurs, it can either result in a pool fire, an explosion or no effect, 
depending on the results of the branching events, immediate ignition, and delayed ignition.  
The model provides four scenarios:  
      s1: release - A - pool fire   
      s2: release - not A – B - pool fire (flash fire)   
      s3: release - not A – B - explosion  
      s4: release - not A - not B - no effect.  
The quantities X and Z are unknown, and knowledge-based (subjective) probabilities are 
used to express the uncertainties (degree of belief). Suppose the following assignments 
have been made given the background knowledge K of the analysts:  
   P(X= 1) = EX = 0.005 
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   P(Z1 = 1) = P(A) = 0.3   
   P(Z2 =1| Z1 = 0) =  P(B| not A) = 0.2  
   P(Z3 =1| Z1 = 0, Z2 = 1) =  P(pool fire | not A,B) = 0.4.   
     To interpret these numbers, consider for example, P(Z1 = 1). We have  P(Z1 = 1) =  
P(A|K) = 0.3, which means that the analysts consider the uncertainty of immediate ignition 
occurring (given a release) to be the same as drawing a red ball out of an urn which 
comprises ten balls of which three are red (Lindley [6]).  
     From this input we can use simple probability calculus to compute knowledge-based 
probabilities of the various releases; for example, we find 
     P(s3) = 0.005 · 0.7· 0.2· 0.6 = 4.2 · 10-4.  
This illustrates the analysis; now let us reflect on the suitability of this approach in the risk 
analysis context.    
Discussion   
     This way of conducting the analysis is simple, and all quantities introduced are well- 
defined and understandable. The probabilities produced are expressing the analysts’ 
(experts’) uncertainty (degree of belief) conditional on the background knowledge K of 
the analysis. The assigned probabilities, for example P(A) = 0.3, could be based on data; 
for example, we may have a situation where we have 3 “successes” out of 10 observations. 
Hence we derive at P(A) = 0.3, where A is the “success” event. This is our (i.e., the 
analyst’s) assessment of uncertainty about A. This probability is not an estimate of an 
underlying true probability p=Pf(A) as in the frequentist setting, but an assessment of 
uncertainty related to the occurrence of A.  
     The probability P(A) could alternatively have been established on the basis of 
analyst judgements using all sources of information.  This is a method commonly 
adopted when data are absent or are only partially relevant to the assessment endpoint. A 
number of uncertain exposure and risk assessment situations are in this category. The 
responsibility for summarising the state of knowledge, producing the written rationale, and 
specifying the probability distribution rests with the analyst (Kaplan [4], Aven [1]). In 
some cases formal expert elicitation can also be adopted to assign the probabilities. 
Formal expert elicitation may be undertaken when little relevant data can be made 
available and when it is likely that the judgement of the analyst will be subject to scrutiny, 
resulting for example in costly project delays. Formal expert elicitation could be very 
expensive, so a justification for when to adopt such a procedure is required (Kaplan [4], 
Aven [1]).  
     The main problem with this approach is that there exists no formal procedure for 
systematically incorporating information and distinguishing between variation and lack of 
knowledge (epistemic uncertainties). Say that we, at a specific point in time, have assigned 
P(A) = 0.3 by a direct argument, and then need to adjust this number as a result of getting 
some new data relevant for this event.  How should we then update our probability? The 
answer using the direct assignment approach is simply to perform a new direct assignment. 
Obviously such a method could lead to inconsistencies and the production of some rather 
arbitrary numbers in some cases. The Bayesian machinery, as will be considered in the 
next section, is much better in this respect as it provides a well-established and justified 
approach for how to carry out such updates.                
     The use of modelling could of course improve the assignment process with respect 
to consistency. In the next section we cover the case when probability models can be 
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justified. But first let us summarise the method studied in the present section, its features 
and its pros and cons (Tables 1-2).     
Table 1:  Summary of Features of the Unique Event Case 
Feature Explanation 
Quantities  
of interest  
Occurrence of scenarios si  
Uncertainty description for these  P(si|K) 
Model  Event tree, for example s3 = g(X,Z1,Z2,Z3) =  
X(1- Z1) Z2 (1-Z3)   
Unknown model 
parameters/quantities 
X, Z1,Z2,Z3   
Uncertainty description for these P(X=1|K), P(Zi= 1|K), i=1,2,3    
Method for these assignments  Data, analyst judgement using all sources of information, 
formal expert elicitation, modelling 
Table 2:  Summary of Pros and Cons of Method for Unique Event Case 
Pros Cons 
  
Simple to conduct  Difficult to ensure consistency  
All quantities well-defined and can be 
given easily understandable interpretations  
Lack a procedure for taking  into account new 
information  
 The numbers assigned may be difficult to assign 
(numbers may be seen as somewhat arbitrary)    
3.  The Case with Probability Models introduced (Probability of Frequency 
Approach)    
     Now let us assume that the analysts can justify the introduction of a probability 
model with parameters as follows (see Figure 2): 
            q0 =  Ef[X] 
            q1 =  Pf(A)    
            q2 =  Pf(B| not A) 
            q3 =  Pf(pool fire| not A,B).  
     For q1, q2 and q3 it is tacitly assumed that the frequentist probabilities/chances are 
conditional on the occurrence of a release.  To interpret the parameters we need to 
construct infinite populations of similar situations to the one studied. For example, q1 
represents the fraction of times immediate ignition occurs in the case of a release if the 
situation is repeated over and over again.    
     If we know all parameter values we can calculate the probabilities of the various 
scenarios using standard probability calculus. However, all parameters are unknown and 
we use knowledge-based (subjective) probabilities to express the analysts’ uncertainties 
about the true value of these parameters.  
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q1
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Figure 2: Event Tree for the LNG case, based on Probability Models   
     Let us concentrate our focus on the relative frequency probability of the scenario s2 
or s3 occurring; let us call this frequentist probability r. From the above analysis, we have 
established a relationship (model) between this quantity and the underlying model 
parameters:  q0, q1, q2 and q3:  
          r = Pf(s2) + Pf(s3) = q0 [(1- q1) q2 q3 + (1- q1) q2 (1-q3)] = q0 (1- q1) q2.  
     We next establish uncertainty distributions on the qi parameters and use the event 
tree model to propagate these uncertainties to an uncertainty distribution for r. A 
numerical example will explain the ideas.  
     Let us first consider q0, the expected number of releases.  As an estimate of q0, we 
used 0.005. To reflect uncertainties we use a subjective probability distribution. This 
distribution may, for example, be a beta-distribution, a triangular distribution or a uniform 
distribution. For this case we will simply assume that the analyst specifies a uniform 
distribution on the interval [0.003, 0.007], which means that the analyst is confident that 
the true q0 lies in this interval, and that his/her degree of belief that q0 lies in the interval 
[0.003, 0.005] is the same as [0.005, 0.007] (50%).  We make similar assumptions for the 
other parameters. See overview in Table 3.   
Table 3: Knowledge-based probabilities for the parameters q0, q1, q2 and q3 
Parameter  Distribution type  Interval  
q0 Uniform  [0.003,0.007] 
q1 Uniform [0.2,0.4] 
q2 Uniform [0.1,0.3] 
q3 Uniform [0.1,0.7]  
     Using these distributions and assuming “independent” distributions for the qi 
parameters, we can calculate the knowledge-based distributions for r. Independence here 
means that if, for example, we know that q2  is equal to 0.12 (say),  this would not affect 
our uncertainty assessment of q3 (say).  
     To establish the output distributions using analytical formulae is difficult. It is easier 
to use Monte Carlo simulation, and this is the common approach for performing this type 
of uncertainty assessment.  Random numbers for each parameter are drawn, and, using 
the formula r = q0 (1- q1) q2, we obtain the associated uncertainty distribution of r, shown 
in Table 4 and Figure 3. Note that these values are estimates of the probabilities given by 
the input of the Monte Carlo simulations: the uniform distributions and the formula r = q0 
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(1- q1) q2. The estimation error is small as the number of replications is large. Hence, there 
is a knowledge-based probability of 44% that the chance of at least one fatality is in the 
interval (0.04%, 0.07%].  
Table 4: Knowledge-based Probabilities P, for r 
Interval for r  Interval for r. 
Reformulated intervals 
(% ) (x 10-2) 
Simulated 
probability   
≤0.0002 ≤  0.02     0.00 
(0.0002, 0.0004] (0.02, 0.04]     0.12 
(0.0004, 0.0007] (0.04, 0.07]     0.44 
(0.0007, 0.0010] (0.07, 0.10]     0.28 
(0.0010, 0.0013] (0.10, 0.13]     0.13 
(0.0013, 0.0016] (0.13, 0.16]     0.03 
> 0.0016 > 0.16     0.00 
 
(0.0002, 0.0004] (0.0004, 0.0007] (0.0007, 0.0010] (0.0010, 0.0013] (0.0013, 0.0016]
Simulated probability
distribution of r 
r0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
 
Figure 3: Knowledge-based Probabilities P for r based on Table 3   
Discussion  
     The probability of frequency approach is theoretically appealing. It is in line with 
Bayesian theory. The idea is to first establish probability models that adequately represent 
the aleatory uncertainties, i.e., the inherent variability of the phenomena studied. The 
epistemic uncertainties, reflecting incomplete knowledge or lack of knowledge about the 
values of the parameters of the models, are then represented by prior subjective probability 
distributions. When new data on the phenomena studied become available, Bayes’ formula 
is used to update the representation of the epistemic uncertainties in terms of the posterior 
distributions. Finally, the predictive distributions of the quantities of interest, the 
observables, are derived by applying the law of total probability. The predictive 
distributions are epistemic, but they also reflect the inherent variability of the phenomena 
being studied, i.e., the aleatory uncertainties.  
     However, in practice the method is not so easy to implement. Following this 
approach, the analysts are to express the epistemic uncertainties about the parameters of 
the probability models using subjective probabilities.  In practice, it could be difficult to 
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perform a complete uncertainty analysis within this setting. In theory, an uncertainty 
distribution on the total model and parameter space should be established, which is hard to 
do for complex cases with hundreds of parameters. If the uncertainty analyses do not cover 
all parameters, it is difficult to interpret the produced uncertainties.   
     It is obviously a challenge in practice to establish the epistemic distributions, as 
indicated above. However, more important is the conceptual issues. Introducing the 
chances means two levels of uncertainty, and one may question what is gained by this 
second level. The standard answer would be that we need to establish the probability 
models with the associated parameters to be able to apply the Bayesian machinery for 
ensuring consistency in the probability assignments and in the updating of probabilities in 
the case that new information becomes available. For many types of applications, such 
updating is important, in particular for risk assessments in an operational phase. However, 
for many cases (like the LNG case), such an updating is not considered essential, as the 
assessments are carried out at particular points in time to support specific decisions at 
these points. The assessment process is not of the form typically implemented when using 
Bayes’ formula.  
     This approach presumes that a probability model can be justified. The key point is 
that we can generate an infinite, i.e., in practice a large, number of similar situations to the 
one studied. For the LNG case, we need to think about similar years, or weeks or plants, 
but we quickly see that defining such a large population could be difficult – what should 
be fixed and what should be allowed to vary to generate the aleatory uncertainties?  
Defining the population that generates the aleatory uncertainties is critical for the proper 
understanding of what the parameters express. It is obvious that if we cannot provide 
meaningful interpretations of the parameters, the uncertainty analysis of the parameters 
will lose its importance as the numbers generated lack basis.   
     As noted by Singpurwalla [7], p. 17, the concept of frequentist probabilities “is 
applicable to only those situations for which we can conceive of a repeatable experiment”. 
This excludes many situations and events. Think of the rise of the sea level over the next 
20 years, the guilt or innocence of an accused individual, or the occurrence or not of a 
disease in a specific person with a specific history. Probability models cannot easily be 
defined. In our LNG case, it is easier to think about repeatability, but the definition of the 
large population is not obvious. The analysts need to make it clear what this repeatability 
means. In practice, it is seldom seen that such clarifications are made.   
     Tables 5 and 6 summarise the main features and the pros and cons of the probability 
of frequency approach.  
Table 5: Summary of features of the Probability of Frequency Approach 
Feature Explanation 
  
Quantities  
of interest  
Pf(si), for example r = Pf(s2) + Pf(s3)   
Uncertainty description for these  Knowledge-based distribution of these frequentist 
probabilities (chances)  
Model  For example r = q0 (1- q1) q2  
Unknown model 
parameters/quantities 
qi, i = 0,1,2,3  
Uncertainty description for these P(qi ≤ q| K), i = 0,1,2,3    
Method for these assignments  Bayesian analysis  
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Table 6: Summary of Pros and Cons of the Probability of Frequency Approach 
Pros Cons 
The method has a strong theoretical 
foundation  
Quite complex to conduct  
It provides a basis for ensuring 
consistency  
Could be difficult to interpret the 
parameters of the probability models  
It makes it possible to 
systematically take into account 
new information  
Difficult to carry out complete 
uncertainty analyses  
4.   Conclusions   
     The issue is then, in a real case, which approach should be adopted? To answer this 
question, one has to clarify what are really the key quantities of interest. If it is clear that 
these quantities are frequentist probabilities, the probability model approach – i.e., the 
probability of frequency approach − should be adopted. If it is not clear what the key 
quantities of interest are, the following question needs to be asked: is it important to have 
at hand a framework where new information can be systematically incorporated? If the 
answer is yes, the probability of frequency should be adopted, provided that frequentist 
probabilities can be justified. In all other cases, the unique event case should be adopted. 
Figure 4 shows the different alternatives.        
     Following these guidelines, the probability of frequency approach must be justified. 
The analysts need to make some reflections – are these criteria met? − before proceeding 
to the next stage of the analysis process – introducing the probability model with 
parameters. Such reflections are not often seen in practice.  
     The author of the present paper has good experience with using the unique event 
approach in many cases, for example for situations similar to the LNG case studied in this 
paper. The probability assignment processes are then rather simple, and the results 
achieved have been considered informative for supporting the decision making. Of course, 
due attention also has to be paid to the background knowledge (assumptions) that the 
assessment is based on. The results must always be seen in light of the background 
knowledge. The need for reflecting on the background knowledge also applies of course to 
the probability of frequency approach.   
     When applying the unique event approach, it is possible to use Bayesian analysis for 
a specific event. Say that a frequentist probability p is introduced for the event A, meaning 
that p is the fraction of times A occurs if we consider an infinite (large) number of similar 
situations to the one studied. Then the predictive probability to be used in the overall 
analysis is    
         P(A)  = ∫ P(A|p) dH(p) = ∫ p dH(p) = E[p]  
Where, H is the subjective probability distribution over p.   
     Having said this, it is clear that there exist situations (as shown by Figure 4) that 
benefit from introducing the more comprehensive set-up of the full probability of 
frequency approach. This approach has its attractive features, as discussed in Section 3, 
the main one being that the Bayesian machinery can be applied. Especially for application 
in the operational phase, this machinery is very useful as it allows for a systematic 
incorporation of new information.  
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Figure 4: Schematic Procedure for selecting Analysis Approach    
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